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Abstract 
This study examines the price and flow dynamics under a tradable credit scheme, when the credits can be traded in a free 
market. A continuous dynamic model in a finite time horizon is proposed to describe the travelers’ learning behavior and the 
evolution of network flows and credit price, and then the existence and uniqueness of the equilibria are established. The 
conditions for stability and convergence of the dynamic system as the time horizon extends to infinity and the impact of 
limited implementation time horizon on the system behavior are investigated. 
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1. Introduction 
Rationing and pricing are now primary methods for travel demand management. Rationing is direct and 
expedient for reducing traffic demand, but it may lose its effectiveness in the long run (Davis, 2008; Mahendra, 
2008; Han et al., 2010; Wang et al., 2010). Congestion pricing has become a powerful instrument for traffic 
demand management and is still attracting much attention in research and practice. However, since roads are 
infrastructures and public good, the public’s objection to road pricing never stops, the main arguments about 
road pricing are the inequity of users from different income levels and the disposal of the governmental toll 
revenue. Therefore researchers and planners are looking for other effective methods circumventing the 
shortcomings of road rationing and pricing, for example, the tradable permit scheme (Verhoef et al., 1997), 
tradable vehicle use permits (Goddard, 1997), monthly-distributed and freely-tradable mobility rights (Viegas, 
2001) and tradable bottleneck permits (Akamatsu, 2007, revised 2010). 
A tradable credit scheme was recently proposed by Yang and Wang (2011) for network mobility management. 
As stated in Yang and Wang (2011), with such a scheme, the social planner initially distributes a certain number 
of credits to all eligible travelers, charges a link-specific number of credits from travelers using each link, and 
allows free trading of the credits among travelers. The credits can be used anytime during a prescribed time 
period (e.g. a month, a quarter or half a year) and any unused credits cannot be carried over to next 
implementation period. The tradable credit scheme offers a powerful tool to manage network mobility, traffic 
congestion and environmental quality in an effective, efficient and equitable manner with a revenue-neutral 
property. Specifically, through appropriate distribution of credits among travelers and the correct selection of 
link-specific charge rates, a tradable credit scheme can emulate a congestion pricing scheme or a congestion 
pricing cum revenue refunding scheme to lead to desirable network flow patterns, such as social optima and 
side-constrained traffic flow patterns (Yang and Wang, 2011). The tradable credit scheme has been extended in 
various ways, such as the consideration of transaction cost (Nie, 2012), user heterogeneity (Wang et al., 2012), 
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trial-and-error implementation under limited information (Wang and Yang, 2012), management of bottleneck 
congestion (Nie and Yin, 2013) and parking demand (Zhang et al., 2012), as well as incorporation of income 
effects (Wu et al., 2012). 
 
It has been proven in Yang and Wang (2011) that, for a given credit scheme, there exists a unique equilibrium 
link flow pattern and credit price under mild conditions. Complementing the static and deterministic equilibrium 
model in Yang and Wang (2011), this study looks at the dynamic evolution process of both traffic flows on the 
network and credit price in the trading market towards the final stationary equilibrium. 
 
Pertaining to the current study is the large body of research development on the day-to-day evolution process of 
network flows. Some are based on a deterministic mechanism (for example, Smith, 1984; Friesz et al., 1994; 
Zhang and Nagurney, 1996; Cho and Hwang, 2005; Yang and Zhang, 2009; He et al, 2010; Smith and Mounce, 
2011; Han and Du, 2012; He and Liu, 2012); some are based on a stochastic mechanism (for example, Cascetta, 
1989; Watling and Hazelton, 2003 and recently Parry and Hazelton, 2013). These models can be further 
categorized into continuous-time or discrete-time models and link-based or path-based models. Horowitz (1984) 
discussed a discrete-time dynamic process based on the concept of stochastic user equilibrium with a 
time-varying learning parameter in a two-link network and showed that the learning parameter would affect the 
system stability through day-to-day evolution. Cascetta and Cantarella (1993) and Cantarella and Cascetta (1995) 
presented a general framework of day-to-day traffic dynamics based on demand-supply interaction at path flow 
level and obtained some analytical results, such as the existence, uniqueness and stability of the equilibrium. 
Under a specific learning mechanism, Watling (1999) discussed the stability of the equilibrium on a general 
network and Bie and Lo (2010) further discussed the stability and attraction domain of the dynamic traffic 
system. The issue of existence, uniqueness, stability and convergence of the equilibrium state are always the 
major concerns in day-to-day network modeling and analysis. 
 
Once a credit trading mechanism is introduced into the system, the problem becomes much more complicated, 
yet challenging, as the credit price and flow pattern affect each other and result in the double interacting 
dynamics of both flow adjustment and credit price evolution. In this research, the dynamic traffic evolution 
process can be established in general under certain conditions regarding the travelers’ learning process and credit 
demand-supply interaction. For a given credit distribution and charging scheme for a particular period, the real 
traffic flow pattern governs the credit consumption, which in turn determines the remaining number of credits 
left for the rest of the implementation period. The credit consumption rate and the remaining number of credits 
govern the current credit trading price, which in turn influences the travelers’ current travel costs and path 
choices. It is therefore of immense interest to discern how the system will behave when both the traffic flows and 
credit price impact each other and evolve together. 
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the notations used. In Section 3, we make 
some basic assumptions of the travelers’ learning behavior, travelers’ path choice behavior and the evolution of 
credit price over time. A continuous dynamic model is then developed considering the travelers’ generalized cost, 
including perceived travel time cost and credit cost. Some properties of the dynamic model are discussed in 
detail in Section 4, including the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium point as well as the stability and 
convergence condition under an infinite time horizon. Section 5 provides a numerical example to elucidate the 
results. Conclusions are provided in Section 6. 
 
 
2. Notations 
 
Consider a general network, and let A  denote the set of directed links, W  the set of origin-destination (OD) 
pairs and wR  the set of all paths between OD pair w W , ww W R m  ¦ . The travel demand for each OD 
pair w W  is assumed to be fixed and denoted by wd , 0wd ! . Denote ^ `1 1, , , ,w Ww Wdiag d d d D I I I , 
where wI , w W  is the identity matrix with rank wR . Travelers are assumed to be homogeneous and have 
an identical value of time (VOT) equal to E . The link-path incidence matrix is denoted by Δ . 
 
Consider a continuous-time evolution process in a finite-length time period > @0,T , during which a 
predetermined tradable credit scheme is implemented. At the initial time 0t  , a certain number of credits are 
distributed to the whole population, and any credits left after the expiration time t T  will become worthless. 
The total number of credits distributed is proportional to the length of the time horizon and is given by kT , 
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where k  is a proportionality constant and can be interpreted as the average number of available credits per unit 
time. Furthermore, let laN  be the number of credits charged for using link a A  and  T,ll a a AN κ . 
Denote ,r wN  as the path credit charge of path wr R , w W ,  T, ,w r w wr R N κ  and 
 TT T T1 , , , ,w W κ κ κ κ , then T l κ Δ κ , where TΔ  represents the transpose of Δ . Throughout this study a 
credit scheme for a period > @0,T  is thus defined by  ,;  lak AaN   or  ,;  , ,r w wk r R w WN   . 
 
Let f  and c m  denote the column vectors of path flows and travelers’ perceived path travel times, 
respectively. Denote ,r wC  as travelers’ perceived path travel cost on path wr R , w W  and 
 T, , ,r w wC r R w W  C . Let Av  be the column vector of link flows and assume that the link travel time 
function of link a A  is a continuous function   : Aac  ov , then     T,ac a A c v v  is the actual 
link travel time vector and  TΔ c v  is the actual path travel time vector. Finally, Let  tf ,  tc ,  tC  and 
 p t  denote the column vectors of path flows, perceived path travel times, perceived path travel costs and the 
credit trading price at time t , respectively. 
 
 
3. Assumptions and the continuous-time evolution model 
 
With the above notations, the dynamic evolution of traffic flows and credit price can be presented. 
 
3.1. Travelers’ path choice 
 
Assume the probabilities of travelers choosing paths depend on their perceived path travel costs on all the paths, 
so the path choice probability function is 
     T, , ,r w wr R w W \  ψ C C  (1) 
and 
   f Dψ C  (2) 
where  ,r w\   is continuous on m  and   > @, 0,1r w\    for all wr R , w W . 
 
3.2. Travelers’ learning behavior 
 
Travelers are assumed to possess their own perception of travel time on each path and update their perception 
according to the revealed traffic condition and revealed credit price: 
 
  T  
p
­ ª º D ° ¬ ¼®°  E ¯
c Δ c ΔDψ C c
C c κ
 (3) 
where  t c c ,  t C C ,  p p t  and   0tD  D !  are functions of time > 0,t T . 
 
3.3. Credit price evolution 
 
In a free market, the price of a commodity is affected by its demand and supply. The price is expected to go up 
or go down when demand is greater or less than supply, respectively. When the credits are treated as 
commodities in the credit market, the credit price may fluctuate with the variation of demand and supply. On the 
other hand, since the credits are usable, limited and freely tradable during the whole implementation period, they 
can also be treated as investments. If some agents bank and stock credits, the credit price will depend on not only 
the variation of demand and supply, but also the agents’ prediction of future credit demand and supply as well as 
future credit price. Nonetheless, irrational investment behavior through credit banking and stocking is a 
complicated issue that is beyond the scope of this paper. Here, it is assumed that travelers are all rational and the 
variation of credit price depends only on the current credit price itself and the excess credit demand in the market, 
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defined as the difference between the expected credit consumption rate and the average number of credits per 
unit time available during the rest of the period: 
  ,p Q p Z   (4) 
and 
  T kT uZ p
T t
 E   κ Dψ c κ  (5) 
     T
0
d
t
u s p s s E ³ κ Dψ c κ   (6) 
where  ,Q p Z  is the evolution function of the credit price and Z  is the excess credit demand. The first term 
on the right hand side of eqn. (5) denotes the credit consumption rate or instantaneous credit demand, and the 
second term represents the average number of credits per unit time available during the rest of the period  @,t T . 
Eqn. (6) denotes the total credit consumption during the time period > @0,t . 
 
For the price p  to be always nonnegative, the following assumptions on  ,Q p Z  are made: 
(i) 0p ! ,  ,Q p Z  is strictly increasing with Z ; 
(ii) If 0p  ,  0,Q Z  is strictly increasing with 0Z t ; 
(iii)  ,0 0Q p  , 0p t ;  0, 0Q Z  , 0Z  . 
 
Based on (i)-(iii), we have 
  , 0 0, 0, 0Q p Z pZ p Z   t d  (7) 
 
Combining (3)-(6) yields the following continuous-time evolution process: 
 
    
      
T
T
T 0
d
,
t
t p
kT s p s s
p Q p p
T t
ª º D E  ¬ ¼
§ · E ¨ ¸ E  
­
¨ ¸
°°®°°¯ ¨ ¸© ¹
³
c Δ c ΔDψ c κ c
κ Dψ c κ
κ Dψ c κ
  (8) 
or 
 
    
 
 
T
T
T
,
t p
kT up Q p p
T t
u p
ª º D E  ¬ ¼
§ · E  ¨ ¸
­°°°® © ¹
 E 
°°°¯
c Δ c ΔDψ c κ c
κ Dψ c κ
κ Dψ c κ
 (9) 
> 0,t T  with the initial conditions   00  c c ,   00p p ,  0 0u  . 
 
 
4. System performance analysis 
 
4.1. Solutions to the continuous-time evolution model 
 
First, the continuous-time evolution model should satisfy the following feasibility condition of the credit 
scheme: 
     T
0
lim d
t
t T
s p s s kTo E  d³ κ Dψ c κ  (10) 
which means that the total credit consumption cannot exceed the total credit supply during the whole time 
horizon. Imposing the boundary value condition (10) explicitly will make analysis of the dynamic system (8) 
intractable, or solving (8) directly without constraint (10) may yield an infeasible solution.  
 
Evidently, an infeasible solution of (8) that violates (10) may arise when the demand is fixed and there is no 
credit-free path between certain OD pairs. In a learning environment under uncertainty, travelers may overspend 
credits in the early period, causing shortage of credit supply and a surge of credit price afterwards, even when all 
the travelers use the least credit-charge path. To circumvent this complicated infeasibility issue, we assume that 
the dynamic system (8) always satisfies condition (10). One possibility is that there is at least one path free of 
65 Hongbo Ye and Hai Yang /  Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences  80 ( 2013 )  61 – 78 
credit charge between each OD pair and the system will be able to self-adjust promptly in response to the 
number of credits left. 
 
4.2. Existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium points 
 
Definition 1. For a dynamic system 
  ,t x g x  (11) 
a point * x x  is said to be an equilibrium point of (11) if it has the property that whenever the state of the 
system starts at *x , it will remain at *x  for all future times. 
 
The equilibrium condition for (8) is 0 c  and 0p  , > 0,t T  , i.e., 
 
  
       > 
T
T
T 0
0
0,d
, 0
t
p
t TkT s p s s
p Q p p
T t
ª º D E    ¬ ¼
§ ·  
­°°® E ¨ ¸ E    ¨ ¸¨ ¸©
°°¯ ¹
³
c Δ c ΔDψ c κ c
κ Dψ c κ
κ Dψ c κ
  (12) 
which is equivalent to 
 
  
  > 
T * * *
* T * *
,
0
, 0
0
p
TQ p p
t
k
T
T
t
E    
§ ·ª ºE    ¨ ¸¬ ¼ ©
­°°  ®°°¯ ¹
Δ c ΔDψ c κ c
κ Dψ c κ
  (13) 
Furthermore, by property (7) of  ,Q p Z , (13) is equivalent to 
 
  
  
T * * *
* T * *
0
, 0
p
Q p p k
E    
E ° 
°
¯  
­
®
Δ c ΔDψ c κ c
κ Dψ c κ
 (14) 
Then we have the following two theorems for the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium points. 
 
Theorem 1. If  Tmin limpk k pof! E κ Dψ c κ , then there exists at least one equilibrium point  * *, pc  of 
the dynamic system (8). 
 
Proof. The proof is given in Appendix A.       
 
Remark 1. mink  is the lower bound for the average credit supply k . By Theorem 1, when the credit scheme 
 ,;  , ,r w wk r R w WN    satisfies mink k! , there is always an equilibrium point for the evolution model (8). 
 
Theorem 2. Assume the condition in Theorem 1 is satisfied, and furthermore, if 
(a) the vector of the link travel time functions,  c v , is strictly monotone with respect to the link flow vector v , 
i.e., 
       T1 2 1 2 1 20 z ! v v c v c v v v  (15) 
(b) the negative vector of the path flow demand functions,  Dψ C , is monotone with respect to the path cost 
vector C , i.e., 
       T1 2 1 2 1 20  zdC C Dψ C Dψ C C C  (16) 
(c) the total credit demand function,  T pE κ Dψ c κ , is strictly decreasing with credit price, i.e., 
       T1 2 1 2 1 20p p p p p pE   E  z κ Dψ c κ Dψ c κ  (17) 
then the equilibrium point for (8) is unique. Furthermore, *p  is strictly decreasing with k  when 
 T UEmin ,k k º ¼κ f , where UEf  is the equilibrium flow pattern without the credit scheme, and * 0p   when 
T UEk t κ f . 
 
Proof. The proof is shown in Appendix B.       
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Remark 2. Some additional notes on the sufficient conditions for (15)-(17) are:  
 
(1) A sufficient condition for (15) to hold is that the link travel time functions are smooth with a positive 
definite Jacobian matrix. For example, condition (15) holds if  c  is separable or     ,a ac v a A c v  
and  ac  , a A  , is strictly increasing. 
(2) A sufficient condition for (16) to hold is that the path flow demand functions are smooth with a negative 
semidefinite Jacobian matrix. For example,  ψ  satisfies condition (c) in Theorem 4 or  ψ  takes the 
Logit form. 
(3) A sufficient condition for (17) to hold is that the path flow demand functions and the credit charge scheme 
satisfy Assumptions (c) and (d) in Theorem 4. This is evident because, by Lemma C1 in Appendix C, 
T 0ψκ DJ κ . 
 
4.3. Stability and convergence of the equilibrium point under infinite time horizon 
 
Like any dynamic system, the evolution process may not converge if the time horizon of implementation is finite. 
Here, we analyze the system behavior of (8) as the time horizon approaches infinity. 
 
For (8),   0,t T , 
 
    T, 0max dww r R r ww W tkT s p s s kT
T t
kT t d
T T tt
  E

N dd
¦ ³ κ Dψ c κ  
and 
 ,
max
lim limww r R r ww W
T T
kT t d kT k
T t T t

of of
 N    
¦  
then by the squeeze theorem, 
 
    T
0
ds
lim
t
T
kT s p s
k
T tof
 E   
³ κ Dψ c κ  
If  tD { D  is time-invariant, the nonautonomous system (8) can be converted into the following autonomous 
system: 
 
  
  
T
T,
p
p Q p p k
ª º D E  ¬ ¼­°
E ®°¯  
c Δ c ΔDψ c κ c
κ Dψ c κ
  (18) 
 
For an autonomous system, the definition of stability is as follows: 
 
Definition 2. (Khalil, 2002) Suppose *x  is an equilibrium point of the autonomous system 
   x g x  (19) 
The equilibrium point *x  is 
(1) stable if  0H ! ,    0G  G H ! , such that 
     *0 0t t G    H  tx x x ; 
(2) asymptotically stable if it is stable and G  can be chosen such that 
     *0 lim 0 0
t
t tof G     tx x x . 
 
Then the stability of a nonlinear autonomous system can be analyzed by linearization at the neighborhood of its 
equilibrium point as illustrated in the following theorem. 
 
Theorem 3. (Khalil, 2002) Let *x  be an equilibrium point for the nonlinear system (19)where : mD og  is 
continuously differentiable and D  is a neighborhood of *x . Let 
  
* 
w w x x
gJ x
x
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then *x  is asymptotically stable if the real parts of all the eigenvalues of J  are negative. 
 
Now, the theorem of the stability for the autonomous system (18) can be stated as follows. 
 
Theorem 4. If  Q  ,  c  and  ψ  are continuously differentiable in a neighborhood of the equilibrium 
point  * *, pc , then  * *, pc  is asymptotically stable if the following conditions hold: 
(a) 0pQ t  and 0ZQ ! , where    **
,
,
ZQ p
p p
p
Q w w 
c
 and    **
,
,
ZQ p
Z Z
p
Q w w 
c
; 
(b) *T cΔ J Δ  is symmetric and positive definite, where *cJ  is the Jacobian matrix of  c  at  * *, pc ; 
(c)  ψ  is differentiable on m  and satisfies the following conditions (i)-(v); 
(i) 
 ,
,
0r w
r wC
w\ w
C
, ,wr R w W    (ii)  ,
,
0r w
s wC
w\ !w
C
, , ,wr s R r s  z  
(iii) 
 ,
,
0r w
s vC
w\  w
C
, , ,w vr R s R w v   z  (iv)    ,
, ,
,r w
s w r
s w
wC C
wM wM w w
C C
, , wr s R   
(v)    ,,
,
1 0,  
w w
r w
r w w
r R r R s w
s R
C 
wMM  
§ ·¨ ¸¨ ¸© ¹
   w¦ ¦
C
C  
(d) there is at least one OD pair connected by at least two paths with different credit charges. 
 
Proof. The proof is given in Appendix C.      
 
Remark 3. Some additional notes on the sufficient conditions for conditions (a)-(d) in Theorem 4 are: 
(1) For condition (a), by the property of  ,Q p Z , if  T UEmin ,k k κ f , then * 0p !  and  *,Q p Z  is strictly 
increasing with Z ; if  ,Q p Z  is also continuously differentiable with Z  around  * *,p Z , then 
0ZQ ! . If  ,Q p Z  is continuously differentiable and increasing with p  around  * *,p Z , then 0pQ t . 
So condition (a) is satisfied. For example, 
     
0
,
0
Z p
Q p Z
Z p
­I !° ®ª ºI d°¬ ¼¯
 
or 
    ^ `,Q p Z p Z pª º K  I ¬ ¼ , 0K!  
where > @ ^ `max 0,   ,  ZI  is continuously differentiable and strictly increasing, e.g.,   , 0Z bZ bI  !  
or   1, 1ZZ x xI   ! . 
(2) Condition (b) depends on both the travel time function  c  and the network structure or the link-path 
incidence matrix Δ . If *cJ  is symmetric and positive definite, by Horn and Johnson (1990), *T cΔ J Δ  is 
symmetric and positive definite if and only if  rank m Δ , i.e., Δ  has linearly independent columns. 
(3) If  ψ  takes the Logit form, apparently condition (c) is satisfied. Furthermore, if condition (c) is satisfied, 
then by Lemma C1 in Appendix A, ψDJ  is negative semidefinite and (16) is also satisfied. 
(4) Condition (d) is very mild and can be always satisfied in a practical tradable credit scheme. If (d) is not 
satisfied, since demand is fixed, travelers between each OD pair will consume the same number of credits 
regardless of the paths they choose. In this case, the credit scheme has no effect on traffic flows because 
every path between a certain OD pair has identical credit charge. 
(5) The conditions (a)-(d) in Theorem 4 are consistent with the properties of  ,Q p Z  and the assumptions in 
Theorem 2. 
 
 
5. A numerical example 
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The example network is illustrated in Fig. 1. 
 
2 '





 
Fig.1. Network structure. 
 
There is only one OD pair with a demand of 300. The link credit charges shown in brackets in Fig. 1 are 
1 4 5 0
l l lN  N N  , 2 2lN  , 3 1lN  . Then the paths and path credit charges are: 
Path 1: 1 3O Do o o    1,1 1N   
Path 2: 2 4O Do o o    2,1 2N   
Path 3: 2 5 3O Do o o o   3,1 3N   
The link travel time functions take the well-known BPR form: 
  41 0.15
100
a
a a
vc v § ·  ¨ ¸© ¹ . 
The path choice probability follows the Logit function with a unit scaling parameter. The price evolution 
function is given by 
  ^ `
0
, max 0, 0
bZ p
Q p Z bZ p
!­ ®  ¯  
where 0b !  is a constant. Travelers’ value of time is 1E  . 
 
MATLAB with the function ode45 is employed to solve the ordinary differential equation set (8) numerically. 
Choosing 450k  , substituting all the functions and parameters into (13) and executing the numerical 
calculation gives a unique equilibrium point  * 4.08, 3.09, 4.75 c  and * 1.15p   
 
5.1. Price evolution with different lengths of time horizon and different initial prices 
 
Choose 450k  ,  1 1,00 2c c  ,  2 2,00 2c c   ,  3 3,00 3c c   , 0.5D  , 0.05b  . 
  ^ `00 0,1.2, 2.0, 2.5p p  , ^ `5,15, 200T  . We examine the system behavior when evolving in different time 
horizons, starting with different initial prices. The results are shown in Fig. 2. 
 
 
(a) Time horizon 5T   
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(b) Time horizon 15T   
 
 
(c) Time horizon 200T   
 
Fig. 2. Price evolution with different initial prices and in different time horizons. 
 
When 5T  , the prices are not stable, either going down or up sharply near the end of the period, and are far 
away from the equilibrium point. When 15T  , the price changes very little near the end of the period, but gaps 
exist between these price trajectories. It is clear that all the price trajectories practically converge to the same line 
and approach equilibrium when the period is long enough, e.g. 200T  . Note that the evolution processes are 
quite different with different initial prices. It is worth mentioning that the price evolution process depends not 
only on the initial prices, but also on the initial perceived travel times, credit schemes, system parameters and so 
on. 
 
5.2. Evolution of perceived travel times with different initial values 
 
Here we fix 3,0 4c   and 0 1.2p  , and choose 450k  , 0.5D  , 0.05b  , 100T  . The trajectories of 1c  
and 2c  with different initial values are shown in Fig. 3. 
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Fig. 3. Trajectories of perceived path travel times on path 1 and 2 with different initial values. 
 
It is clearly shown that when the time horizon is long enough (like 100T   or even longer), 1c  and 2c , with 
different initial values, all approach the same point at around  4.1,  3.1 . 
 
5.3. Sensitivity of the equilibrium point with respect to different credit schemes 
 
Choose 1,0 2,0 3,0 4c c c   , 0 2p  , 0.5D  , 0.05b   and > @280,480k . Fig. 4 shows how the equilibrium 
point varies when k  changes. 
 
 
 
Fig. 4. Change of the equilibrium point with different credit schemes, > @280,480k . 
 
As shown in Fig. 4, when 300k d , the price is around 700, which is very high due to the unrealistically tight 
credit scheme. In this situation, the equilibrium point does not even exist because it violates the condition that 
mink k!  in Theorem 1. Since the path choice probability follows the Logit model, thus when p of , all the 
travelers choose the path with the least credit charge, i.e., path 1 with a credit charge of 1. Therefore 
min 300 1k  u . When 300k d , the credit supply does not satisfy all travelers’ minimum demand, the price will 
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eventually go to infinity. The results for  @300,480k  are depicted in Fig. 5. The credit price decreases 
monotonically with k  and approaches zero when 480k  . This observation is consistent with the result in 
Theorem 2. 
 
 
 
Fig. 5. Change of the equilibrium point with different credit schemes,  @300,480k . 
 
5.4. Influence of system parameters on price evolution 
 
Let ^ `0.1, 0.5, 0.9D , ^ `0.005, 0.05, 0.5b , and choose 450k  , 1,0 2,0 3,0 4c c c   , 0 1p  , 60T  . Fig. 
6 displays the evolution processes of credit price with different D  and b . A larger D  means that travelers 
count on real traffic information more than their perception, which makes the system evolve and stabilize faster 
and meanwhile inflicts a more dramatic change in price. A larger b  means that the credit market is more 
sensitive to the shortage or surplus of credits, which expedites the evolution of the credit price to a stable one, 
and meanwhile leads to a higher peak and sharper change in price. 
 
 
Fig. 6. Price evolution with different system parameters. 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
In this paper, the evolution dynamics of price and perceived travel times under the tradable travel credit scheme 
recently proposed by Yang and Wang (2011) has been studied. A continuous-time evolution model in a general 
network is set up considering travelers’ path choice and learning behavior as well as the price evolution in the 
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credit trading market. Theoretically, we analyzed the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium point and 
examined the system stability under an infinite time horizon. From the numerical examples conducted, it is 
found that the length of the time horizon of the credit scheme is critical for the system performances especially in 
terms of stability and convergence. When the time horizon is sufficiently long, the system with different initial 
conditions will eventually become stable and convergent, which is consistent with our theoretical result. 
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Appendix A. Proof of Theorem 1 
 
We begin our proof of Theorem 1 with the following lemma. 
 
Lemma A1. c  and p  solve 
   T, 0Q p p kE    κ Dψ c κ  (20) 
if and only if they solve 
  Tp p p k ª º  E  ¬ ¼κ Dψ c κ  (21) 
 
Proof. From (7), eqn. (20) holds if and only if 
  T 0p p kª ºE    ¬ ¼κ Dψ c κ , 0p t ,  T 0p kE   dκ Dψ c κ  (22) 
If c  and p  satisfy (22), then either 
 0p  ,  T 0p kE   dκ Dψ c κ  (23) 
or 
 0p t ,  T 0p kE    κ Dψ c κ  (24) 
and both (23) and (24) satisfy (21). 
 
Conversely, if c  and p  satisfy (21), then either 
    T T
0 0
0 0
p p
p p k p k
  ­ ­° °® ® E   d E   d° °¯ ¯κ Dψ c κ κ Dψ c κ
 (25) 
or 
    T T
0 0
0
p p
p p p k p k
! !­ ­° °® ®  E   E    ° °¯ ¯κ Dψ c κ κ Dψ c κ
 (26) 
and both (25) and (26) satisfy (22). Therefore (21) and (22) are equivalent to each other, so Lemma A1 holds.      
 
 
Proof of Theorem 1. By Lemma A1, the equilibrium equation set (14) is equivalent to the following fixed point 
problem: 
 
  
 
T
T
p
p p p k 
 E 
ª º 
­°® E  ¼°¯ ¬
c Δ c ΔDψ c κ
κ Dψ c κ
 (27) 
 
Theorem 1 is now proven by resorting to the following Brouwer’s fixed point theorem. 
 
Theorem A1. (Khamsi and Kirk, 2001) Let :  be a bounded closed convex subset of m  and let ::o:g  
be continuous. Then g  has a fixed point. 
 
It suffices to prove that there exist bounded closed convex sets :c  and p: , such that for all :cc  and 
pp: ,   T pE  :cΔ c ΔDψ c κ  and  T pp p k ª º E   ¼ :¬ κ Dψ c κ . 
 
1) Since the path choice probability  ,0 1r wd \  d , ,wr R w W   , and  c  is continuous and 
nonnegative, then there exists  T1, , my y ty 0 , such that    T d d0 Δ c ΔDψ y . Therefore, the set 
> @ > @10, 0, my y u u:c  is compact and convex, and   :cc  and 0p t ,   T pE  :cΔ c ΔDψ c κ . 
 
74   Hongbo Ye and Hai Yang /  Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences  80 ( 2013 )  61 – 78 
2) Denote    T,Z p p k E  c κ Dψ c κ , then 
    T minlim , lim 0p p kp kZ p kof of E     c κ Dψ c κ ,  :cc  (28) 
For some ˆ:cc , if 
  ˆ, 0Z p dc , 0p t  (29) 
then  ˆ,p Z p pª º d¬ ¼c , 0p t . Define :c  as the set of all the ˆ:cc  satisfying condition (29) and define 
\ :  : :c c c , then for a certain ˆ :cc ,  ˆ, 0Z p !c  for some 0p t . By (28), there exists 0p t , such that 
 ˆ, 0Z p dc  p p t , and thus  ˆ,p Z p pª º d¬ ¼c  p p t . Define  ˆ ˆmax ,p p pp Z p d ª º ¬ ¼c c , then 
ˆ0,p p
ª º ¬ ¼c ,  ˆ,p Z p pª º d¬ ¼c . Therefore ˆˆ0,maxpp p :ª º:  ¬ ¼c cc  and :cc , 
 , pp Z p ª º :¬ ¼c . 
 
From 1) and 2), p: u:c  is convex and compact. Since functions  c ,  ψ  and > @  are continuous, then 
by Theorem A1, there exists at least one fixed point for (27), meaning that there is at least one equilibrium point 
for (8). This completes the proof.      
 
 
Appendix B. Proof of Theorem 2 
 
We first prove that the equilibrium point is unique. Assume there are two equilibrium points  1 1, pc  and 
 2 2, pc  satisfying (14), then 
      T T1 2 1 2  c c Δ c ΔDψ C Δ c ΔDψ C  (30) 
and by (7) 
 
   
   
T T
1 1 1 1
T T
2 2 2 2
0, 0
0, 0
0,
0,
p k p k
p k p k
ª º   d¬ ¼
ª º
t
t   d¬ ¼
κ Dψ C κ Dψ C
κ Dψ C κ Dψ C
 (31) 
where 1 1 1p E C c κ  and 2 2 2p E C c κ . We thus have 
 
      
       
   
T
1 2 1 2
T T T T
1 1 1 2 2 2 2
T T
1 2 2
1
1
0
p p
p p p p
p k p k
 
   
ª º ª º   ¬ ¼ ¬ ¼
t
κ Dψ C Dψ C
κ Dψ C κ Dψ C κ Dψ C κ Dψ C
κ Dψ C κ Dψ C
 (32) 
From (15) and (30), 
 
           
           
      
T
1 2 1 2
T
T T
1 2 1 2
T
1 2 1 2
0

 
 
t



ΔDψ C ΔDψ C c ΔDψ C c ΔDψ C
Dψ C Dψ C Δ c ΔDψ C Δ c ΔDψ C
Dψ C Dψ C c c
 (33) 
where the equality holds if and only if    1 2 ΔDψ C ΔDψ C , or equivalently 1 2 c c . On the other hand, from 
(16), 
 
      
         
             
T
1 2 1 2
T
1 1 2 2 1 2
T T
1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
0
p p
p p

 E   E  
 E    


d
C C Dψ C Dψ C
c κ c κ Dψ C Dψ C
c c Dψ C Dψ C κ Dψ C Dψ C
 (34) 
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The equilibrium points  1 1, pc  and  2 2, pc  satisfy (32)-(34) simultaneously if and only if the three equalities 
hold simultaneously, so 1 2 c c . Moreover, by (17), the equality in (32) holds if and only if 1 2p p . Therefore, 
the equilibrium point is unique. 
 
Next, we prove the monotonicity of *p  with respect to k . Assume  1 1, pc  and   2 2, pc  are the 
equilibrium points under credit schemes  1;k κ  and  2;k κ , respectively, 1 2k kz , then 
 
  
       
      
      
1 2
1 2
1 2
1 1 2 2
T T T T
1 1 1 2 2 1
1 2
2 2
T
1 2 1 2
T
1 2 1 2
0
p p
p p p p
p p
k k
k k k
p
k
p p
p

 

 
d   
  
d E  
d
κ Dψ C κ Dψ C κ Dψ C κ Dψ C
κ Dψ C Dψ C
c c Dψ C Dψ C
 (35) 
Since 1 2k kz ,   11 2 2 0p kp k   if and only if the three inequalities in (35) are simultaneously equal, i.e., 
 
   
      
      
 
 
1
TT T
11 2 2 1 1 2
T
T 2
1 2 1 2
1 2T
1
2 1
2
2 1 2
1 2
0
0
0
0
, 0, kp p k k
p p k
p
k k
p
z
   
 E 
­ t­ ª º ª º    °¬ ¼ ¬ ¼° °° °
  
t® ®° °° °   ¯ °¯
κ Dψ Cκ Dψ C κ Dψ C
κ Dψ Cκ Dψ C Dψ C
c c
c c Dψ C Dψ C
 
Denoting UEf  as the equilibrium flow pattern with zero price or the equilibrium flow pattern without the credit 
scheme, then when T UEk t κ f , * 0p  . 
 
If T1
UEk  κ f  and T2 UEk  κ f , then 1 0p t  and 2 0p  ,   11 2 2 0p kp k d , equality holds if and only if 
1 0p  . However, if 1 0p  , by (33) and (34), 1 2 c c , then   U1 1 ET1 T 0k k  t fκ Dφ C κ  violating 
T
1
UEk  κ f . Therefore, when T1 UEk  κ f , we have 1 0p ! . 
 
If T1
UEk  κ f  and T2 UEk  κ f , then 1 0p ! , 2 0p ! ,  11 Tk  κ Dψ C  and  22 Tk  κ Dψ C . If 1 2 c c , by 
(17) and (35), 1 2p p , contradicting 1 2k kz , so 1 2zc c  and 
 
  
      
      
1 2
T
1 2 1 2
T
1 2
1
2
2
1
0
k kp p
p p

 

 
d E  

κ Dψ C Dψ C
c c Dψ C Dψ C
 
Therefore *p  is strictly decreasing with k  when  T UEmin ,k k º¼ κ f , and * 0p   when T UEk t κ f . This 
completes the proof.      
 
 
Appendix C. Proof of Theorem 4 
 
We begin with the following lemma. 
 
Lemma C1. Let ψJ  denote the Jacobian matrix of  ·ψ  satisfying condition (c) in Theorem 4, then 
(1) ψDJ  is negative semidefinite; 
(2) If there is at least one OD pair connected by at least two paths with different credit charges, then 
T 0ψκ DJ κ . 
 
Proof.  
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(1) By Assumption (iii) of condition (c), ψJ  is a block diagonal matrix denoted as 
^ `1, , , ,w Wdiag ψJ J J J , where wJ  is a square matrix with wR  columns. In addition, 
^ `1 1, , , ,w w W Wdiag d d d D I I I , then ^ `1 1, , , ,w w W Wdiag d d d ψDJ J J J . Consider the block w wd J  and 
denote  iw j r ra u J , wr R . By the assumptions on  ψ , ij jia a , 0iia i  , 0ija i j!  z  and 
1
0r ijj a i  ¦ . Then wJ  is a symmetric and zero-row-sum matrix with negative diagonal entries and positive 
off-diagonal entries, so it is negative semidefinite. Therefore ψDJ  is a block diagonal matrix with all blocks 
negative semidefinite and thus it is negative semidefinite. 
 
(2)    11 TT T T T T T1 1, , , , w w wW W
w W
W W
w
d
d
d 
§ ·¨ ¸  ¨ ¸¨ ¸© ¹
¦ψ Jκ DJ κ κ κ κ κ κ J κ
J
 
For the term T ww wκ J κ , denote  T1, ,, ,w w r w N Nκ  and  w ij r ra u J , then 
 T , , , , ,w w i w j w ij i w i w ii j w ij
i j i j i
w a a a
z
§ · N N  N N  N¨ ¸© ¹¦¦ ¦ ¦k J k  (36) 
Since 
1
0r ijj a  ¦ , (36) is equal to 
  
   
, , ,
, , ,
, , , , , ,
       
       
i w i w ij j w ij
i j i j i
i w j w i w ij
i j i
i w j w i w ij i w j w i w ij
i j i i j i
a a
a
a a
z z
z
! 
ª º§ ·N N   N« »¨ ¸« »© ¹¬ ¼
 N N  N
 N N  N  N N  N
¦ ¦ ¦
¦ ¦
¦¦ ¦¦
 (37) 
For the second term, interchanging the order of summation and then swapping the notations of i  and j  give 
rise to 
      , , , , , , , , ,i w j w i w ij i w j w i w ij j w i w j w ji
i j i j i j i j i
a a a
 ! !
N N  N  N N  N  N N  N¦¦ ¦¦ ¦¦  (38) 
Substituting (38) into (37) and in view of 0ij jia a j i !  z , we have 
 
   
 
T
, , , , , ,
2
, ,                 
                 0
w w i w j w i w ij j w i w j w ji
i j i i j i
i w j w ij
i j i
w a a
a
! !
!
 N N  N  N N  N
  N  N
d
¦¦ ¦¦
¦¦
κ J κ
 
where the equality holds if and only if , , ,,i w j w wi j RN  N   . Therefore T T 0w w
W
w w
w
d

 d¦ψκ DJ κ κ J κ , and 
here the strict inequality holds if and only if there exist some w W  and , ,wi j R i j z  such that , ,i w j wN z N , 
i.e., there is at least one OD pair having two paths with different credit charges.     
 
We now introduce the following four additional theorems for our proof of Theorem 4. 
 
Theorem C1. If A  is invertible, then    1det det det § ·  ¨ ¸© ¹A B A D CA BC D . 
 
Theorem C2. (Lancaster and Tismenetsky, 1985). A matrix H  is positive definite (semidefinite) if and only if it 
has a positive definite (semidefinite) square root, denoted by 1/2H . 
 
Theorem C3. (Horn and Johnson, 1990) The product of a positive definite matrix A  and a Hermitian matrix 
B  is a diagonalizable matrix, all of whose eigenvalues are real. The matrix AB  has the same number of 
positive, negative, and zero eigenvalues as B .  
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Theorem C4. (Horn and Johnson, 1990) For two square matrices A  and B , AB  has the same eigenvalues 
as BA , counting multiplicity. 
 
We are now ready to prove Theorem 4. When  Q  ,  c  and  ψ  are continuously differentiable in a 
neighborhood of  * *, pc , let *ψJ  be the Jacobian of  ψ  at  * *, pc , then the Jacobian of the right hand 
side of (18) at  * *, pc  is 
  * * * *
*
T T
*
T *T
Z p ZQ Q Q
§ ·D E  D ¨ ¸¨ ¸E © ¹
c ψ c ψ
ψ ψ
Δ J ΔDJ I Δ J ΔDJ κ
J κ DJ κ DJ κ  
where I  is an identity matrix of rank m. Let T * cA Δ J Δ  and *  ψB DJ . A  is symmetric and positive 
definite, B  is symmetric and positive semidefinite. Then 
 
1 1
*
T T T T 1pZZ p Z QQQ Q Q
 ª ºD E  D D§ · § ·D E E§ ·§ · § ·   « »¨ ¸¨ ¸¨ ¸ ¨ ¸ ¨ ¸E  © ¹© ¹ © ¹© ¹© ¹ ¬ ¼
AB I ABκ 0A B A Bκ IJ κ B κ Bκ κ B κ Bκ  
which, by Theorem C4, has the same eigenvalues as 
 
1 1 1 1
1T T T T1 pZ Z p ZQQ Q Q Q
   

ª ºª º § ·§ · § ·D DEE E E§ ·§ · § ·§ ·   « »« »¨ ¸ ¨ ¸ ¨ ¸ ¨ ¸¨ ¸ ¨ ¸¨ ¸© ¹ © ¹ © ¹© ¹© ¹ © ¹ © ¹¬ ¼ ¬ ¼
00A AI B A Bκ B A Bκ
κ B κ Bκ κ B κ Bκ  
which in turn, by Theorem C3, has the same number of positive eigenvalues as the following symmetric matrix 
 
1 1
1T T
p ZQ Q
 

§ ·§ ·E  ¨ ¸¨ ¸© ¹ © ¹
0B A Bκ
κ B κ Bκ  (39) 
The second term of (39) is positive semidefinite since 0pQ t  and 0ZQ ! . We shall now prove below that the 
first term of (39) is positive definite by showing that all its leading principal minors are positive. 
 
1) 1A  is positive definite since A  is positive definite and B  is positive semidefinite, then 1 1 EB A  is 
positive definite, and all its leading principal minors are positive. Then the first m  leading principal minors of 
the first term of (39) are positive. 
 
2) For the  1 thm   leading principal minor of the first term of (39), by Theorem C1, we have 
     1 1 11 1 T T 1 1T Tdet det det     § ·E  E   E¨ ¸© ¹B A Bκ B A κ Bκ κ B B A Bκκ B κ Bκ  
where  1 1det 0 E !B A . Then we prove   1T T 1 1det 0  E !κ Bκ κ B B A Bκ . Since 1 1 E A  is positive 
definite, then there exists an orthogonal matrix U  such that 1 1 1 T  E   A U ΛU U ΛU , where 
^ `1, , mdiag O OΛ  and 0iO ! , 1,2, ,i m , are the eigenvalues of 1 1 E A . Then 
 
 
 
 
 
1T T 1 1
1T 1/2 1/2 1 1 1/2 1/2
1T 1/2 1/2 T 1/2 1/2
1T 1/2 1/2 T T 1/2 1/2
 
 


  E
ª º  E« »¬ ¼
ª º  « »¬ ¼
ª º  « »¬ ¼
κ Bκ κ B B A Bκ
κ B I B B A B B κ
κ B I B B U ΛU B B κ
κ B I B U UBU Λ UB B κ
 
For the term 
   11/2 T T 1/2 I B U UBU Λ UB  (40) 
by Theorem C4, the ith eigenvalue is given by 
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11/2 T T 1/2
11/2 T T 1/2
1T 1/2 1/2 T
1T T
1T
1T
1T
=1
1
1
1
1 1
i
i
i
i
i
i
i







O  
 O 
  O 
ª º  O   ¬ ¼
  O  
ª º   O « »¬ ¼
 O 
I B U UBU Λ UB
B U UBU Λ UB
UBU Λ UB B U
UBU Λ UBU Λ Λ
I UBU Λ Λ
UBU Λ Λ
UBU Λ Λ
 
which is positive since both   1T UBU Λ  and Λ  are positive definite. So (40) is positive definite. If there is 
at least one OD pair having two paths with different credit charges, then T 1/2 zκ B 0  (otherwise 
T 1/2 1/2 T 0  κ B B κ κ Bκ , contradicting the conclusion in Lemma C1). So 
   1T T 1 1det 0  E !κ Bκ κ B B A Bκ  
and therefore 
 
1 1
T Tdet 0
 § ·E !¨ ¸© ¹
B A Bκ
κ B κ Bκ  
 
We have so far shown that all the leading principal minors of the first term of (39) are positive, so it is positive 
definite, and thus the whole matrix (39) is positive definite. Then all the eigenvalues of *J  are real and 
positive, and thus all the eigenvalues of *J  are real and negative. With reference to Theorem 3, the system is 
asymptotically stable at the equilibrium point  * *, pc .       
